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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PRESTON & CHAMBERS, P.C.
Plaintiff, Counterclaim
Defendant, and Appellee

Case No. 960590-CA

vs.
EVAN O. ROLLER,
Defendant, Counterclaimant,
and Appellant.

(Priority No. 10)

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
THE JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
The difference between Appellant's designation of this appeal as an interlocutory
appeal and the Appellee's attempt to limit the appeal to a Rule 54(b) Certification is
noteworthy. Under Rule 27, U.R.A.P., interlocutory appeals have oral argument priority
10, which the Appellant designated. Appellee designated argument priority 15. Black's Law
Dictionary, 4th Edition, Page 952, states "interlocutory" is "something intervening between
the commencement and the end of a suit, which decides some point or matter, but is not
a final decision of the whole controversy." Also focusing on a final decision on less than the
whole, Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., states:
. . .the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination by
1

the Court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction
for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties,
and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis added.)
Rule 54(b) provides finality to an interlocutory order. The definition of interlocutory is
more inclusive than a Rule 54(b) certification. All 54(b) certifications are interlocutory.
Some interlocutory orders are not granted Rule 54(b) certification. A partial decision
having a Rule 54(b) certification is still interlocutory. Argument priority number 10 is
appropriate.
Appellee argues against the broader "interlocutory" designation of this appeal to limit
appeal issues to only whether Roller's malpractice counterclaim against Preston should be
dismissed.1 Roller's Petition for Permission to Appeal from Interlocutory Order, dated
March 21, 1996, sought an appeal from the Interlocutory Order the Trial Court signed
March 18,1996. The March 18 Order granted Rule 54(b) certification to the Court's Partial
Summary Judgment Order of September 25, 1996. The interlocutory Partial Summary
Judgment thus obtained Rule 54(b) certification, subject to appeal as a matter of right. The
Petition for Permission to Appeal was accepted by the Supreme Court's Order of June 19,
1996, Supreme Court No. 960162, and the appeal can thus include all matters raised by the
Petition:

See pp. 19-21, Brief of Appellee.
2

The Court finds that the summary judgment was certifiable under Rule 54(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedures, and is therefore, final and the petition for
interlocutory appeal should be treated as a notice of appeal.
This Order does not appear to reject the Petition for Permission to Appeal from
Interlocutory Order, or to substitute the relief requested. It takes the shortest route to
approve the interlocutory appeal.
The appeal is, thus, of the interlocutory ruling March 19, 1996, rather than only the
September 25, 1996 Partial Summary Judgment. This Court may therefore choose to
reevaluate the Trial Court's ruling, and limit the issues of fact in the accounting portion of
the case.

If it did, this Court could grant Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment that Koller overpaid Preston at least the principal amount of $11,669.78, and
determine there are no other accounting issues of material fact, and dismiss the Complaint.
Avoiding this review appears to be Appellee's motive in arguing there is really only one
issue on appeal. Koller argues this issue in Point VI of his Argument, Page 37 and Page
14, Part 5 and Footnote 9, Brief of Appellant.
Of course the main issue of Roller's Interlocutory Appeal is to require trial of the
disputed material facts about Preston's alleged legal malpractice.

Koller desires this

evidence be presented to the jury, along with evidence of all remaining accounting issues.
Roller's accounting counterclaim alleges over-billing related not only to inadequate legal
work, but also caused by errors in Preston's billing procedure.
THE ONE CENTRAL ISSUE
The Trial Court did not give Koller the favorable inferences to which he is entitled,
as opposer of the Summary Judgment. Most of Roller's Counterclaim, the part alleging

3

inadequate legal work, was improperly dismissed. There are genuine material disputes
about Plaintiffs inadequate work, and about Roller's right to personally testify about those
facts, and about the amount of time Koller is allowed to obtain expert witnesses. Koller was
denied his rightful inferences! The main issue is not whether Koller had expert witness(es)
"fully prepared" and deposed by October 28, 1996. The issue is the reasonableness of the
Orders dismissing most of Roller's Counterclaim.
THE MOST CRITICAL STANDARD OF REVIEW
Had the Court reviewed the facts and all factual inferences in the light most
favorable to Koller, the Trial Court would have applied the standards described on Pages
24 through 26 of the Brief of Appellant Evan O. Koller. The Judge would have concluded
or inferred Koller presented enough evidence to show the elements of malpractice required
by Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993), and met the standard for client
testimony supported in Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1982). The Court also
would have determined the sanction Plaintiff asked for, dismissal, was too final and
exceeded the guidelines of Rule 37(b)(2) U.R.C.P., to only impose sanctions "as are just".
The Trial Court's decision was not just, because it was made before a Rule 37(a) Motion
to Compel, before any discovery conference contemplated by Rule 26(f) U.R.C.P., without
also resolving all discovery issues, without any trial date, and before there had been a pretrial conference. The Judge imposed a discovery cut-off date only for Defendant's expert,
while other discovery had not been concluded. This is contrary to the standards impliedly
accepted by the Court of Appeals in Hoopilaina v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d
270,271 (Utah App. 1987), which only approved the sanction of granting summary judgment
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to dismiss on the very eve of trial, within one week of the trial setting. See pp. 29, 30 Brief

App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) and Carman v. Slavens, 546 Y Id 6r
1976) suggest a general witness disclosure date after a T :
pleadii lgs are n lore appropriate than dismissal. These cases found trial judge abuses of
discretion had denied litigants' rights by dismissing too hastily
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There were definite material disputes about Plaintiffs alleged malpractice. The Trial
Court abused its discretion l"v ifiipoMiii1: llit; s.tir Irii "I 'hsinissing tin. p'trtnns "I l\ illi i \
counterclaim alleging malpractice because Koller had not obtained an attorney expert ! ••n\
prepared with final opinions about Preston's duty of care, "J'lie Judge admiilctl he did nol
piM"in\ .OTitl.'U!1'- i" I- *"' I -1»| • \r*\"c< nt which were Roller's sworn affidavits or sworn answers
to Interrogatories, all filed before the August 29, 1995 hearing. Preston produced no
affidavits on IL, m<i Nil i mMi i>l in ilphu IM

MI1 inemnunda arginnj! (oi puu t Juia!

sanctions because a fully prepared expert had not yet been identified. The record itself
shows the procedural expectations discussed in the Standard jf Reviev ? ei e also • : n litt sd
1 •« • •

*\ er\ cut-off date for Roller's expert was isolated from all other discovery matters,

and not reasonably related to any trial date, because there was none
i ,c f

tj

There was none

conference or discovery conference was conducted.

The Judge was without adequate foundation to impose this sanction.
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE JUDGE DID NOT REVIEW THE FACTS AND ALL FACTUAL
INFERENCES IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO ROLLER.

Rules of procedure for the conduct of trials must ultimately be consistent with the
requirements of the U. S. Constitution, which Article VI(2) thereof requires to be "the
supreme Law of the Land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything
in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding". Judicial officers
take an oath to support the U. S. Constitution. The Trial Court's Summary Judgment
denied Roller's right to present evidence to the jury he requested to evaluate Preston's work
and billings. The Judge misquoted Roller's suggestion that Roller himself could testify
about some issues, "It's so obvious that no attorney or expertise would be necessary", was
according to the Judge, "in the Court's mind, not credible"2. What Roller actually said
through his counsel is at R. 815-822. Roller said having an expert was likely the best idea,
but discovery was still continuing, and it was too early to require an expert. See especially
pages R. 819-820. The Trial Court ruling is not credible for three reasons. (1) The Court
did not bother to favor Roller in its review of either the facts about malpractice or the facts
about the incomplete discovery and other procedural matters. (2) The Trial Judge did not
actually read Roller's affidavits. And, (3) the Trial Judge did not allow Roller's reasonable
request for more time when he asked for it.
Roller looked in earnest for expert witnesses when the Court told him to. He spent
several days and several thousand dollars for their time in review. After the hearing August

2

R. 826, Lines 12 and 13.
6

29, 1996, Defendant also had to deal with issues relating to pure accounting questions, as
:

in Koller * -*

Octobc'

! 1995, R, 481-496. That granting more time was reasonable was presented by

aMotiun

i\iciiiujdjnlu

hiil I

HI i

ili

I1

I i i 1 . i i i i II l'i U i l l u ' l ' s AfllililN

IM*) S ( ) 4 ,

all on October 24,1995. These completely destroy Appellee's argument that Koller ignored
the Judge's Order of August 29, 1995. Koller said he had contacted a number of attorneys
,iiL.I .mdil'iis tn Iiiid potential experts, October 24, 1995 Affidavit, R. 505, 113; spent many
days identifying, preparing, and copying documents to take to the potential experts because

reviewing documents, c 5, 6, ai«

id that one potential expert, Jeffrey W. Appel -AXA he

could not be prepared to nmrppi

., ,

Koller also had to spend a great deal of time keeping his farm and other work, 118.
Notwithstanding his time demands, Koller spent four days in Salt Lake City meeting with
.

.d ,-R - r *'

.a

also filed the same opposition at 521-516 and 536-540). Kolle• was not ignoring the Order.
His effoi tsweu ihati. ••: ^ was ignored '" *^]ert^n

\
| h< atfi<l;*\ir u<»fii Jeiii-j. \\

ntl was ,icluall> available

December 12, Nso and tiled m the Coin c December 1 H , .

1

Ihe Trial Court did not review the facts concerning Koller's efforts to provide an
expert, and all reasonable inferences that can be derived therefrom in the light most
I I' i H; il >li In ivi il 11 i

I In I in il ( 'null ' I in mi in I lie ic versed.
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The Trial Court had an obligation to review the facts and all factual inferences in a
light most favorable to Koller. Did Appellee demonstrate the Trial Court did this? No.
The Appellee only demonstrated the Trial Court dismissed Roller's Counterclaim
malpractice allegations because Koller did not produce a fully-prepared and deposed expert
by October 28, 1995. The dismissal was unwarranted by the circumstances.
The Trial Court did not give Koller the favorable inferences to which he is entitled,
as the opposer of the Summary Judgment. Most of Roller's Counterclaim, the part alleging
inadequate legal work, was improperly dismissed. There are genuine material disputes
about Plaintiffs inadequate work, and about Roller's right to personally testify about those
facts, and about the amount of time Koller is allowed to get expert testimony. Koller was
denied his rightful inferences! The main issue is not whether Koller had expert witness(es)
"fully prepared" and deposed by October 28, 1996. The issue is the reasonableness of the
Orders dismissing most of Roller's Counterclaim.
Without reading Roller's affidavits, containing at least the last 146 of 372 pages the
Judge said he attempted to speed read before 11:00 a.m. August 29, 1995, the Judge could
not reasonably have been aware of Roller's knowledge and ability to testify. The matters
the Judge should have inferred in Roller's favor include Roller's Affidavit, R. 200-231,
Roller's Answers to Interrogatories, R. 232-297, and Roller's Supplemental Answers, R. 298346. This 146 pages of detailed information was all sworn to. The Judge only claimed to
have read the memoranda, which ended on page 199. May one take offense that the Judge
thinks speed reading his responsive Memorandum Opposing Summary Judgment was
adequate? This Memorandum, with exhibits A through E, is at R. 161-199.

8

TT ul tin Court reviewed the facts and all factual inferences in the light most

24 through 26 of the Brief of Appellant Evan O. Koller. The Judge would have concluded

by Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 1993), and met the standard for .
testimony supported in Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 ( II Jtah 1982) I he ( > , , ; ,<so
iiLLiori Plaintiff asked for, dismissal, was too final and
exceeded the guidelines of RUM, 3"Yb M'^ U.R.C.P., to only impose sanctions "as are just"
I In

11

1 < ' n I " ""In

•

,JK

i

Motion to Compel, before any discovery conference contemplated b\ Kuie 26(f) L'.R.CP..
without also resolving all discovery issues, without anv t

j before \

i

! c-uicu conference. This independent discovery cut-off date only applied fox u^iwii
to get expert testimony. Other relevant discovery had not yet concluded. This approach

Health Care, 740 P.;\i :^« ; \ (I i.ti, \pp i l ^\* ^ J
granting summary judgmei nil U] IIMIHVN mi iln
setting.

H\ approved the sanction

ci\ i"u nl tn ill viihin nni1 wn.4 mi ilir iiu!

See pp. 29, 30 Brief <*t Appellant, Evan O. Koller.

R.G.W.R.R., 830 P.2( 1 291 (I Jt. ,

\™ V <*ert. denied, •

Berrett v. Denver A:

• ...:

LiiiULiL'- __-i -.iUls, 546 P.2d 601 (Utah 1976) also suggest a witness disclosure date after a
pj-j-iri.i! conference, and after a broad review of the pleadings. These cases found trial
|tnijj;t, jliiijvi> nl liikrii IIIIIII li i,il (Iriiif'il liiH»,nils thru lights \\\ i nproperly dismissing claims.
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Had the Court reviewed the facts and all factual inferences in the light most
favorable to him, and Roller's knowledge, Roller's efforts to obtain an expert, and the
procedure phase of the case all suggest Summary Judgment was inappropriate. Since it was
conditionally granted, an extension should have been allowed. The Trial Court should be
reversed.
II.

THE JUDGE WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE DISPUTED FACTS BECAUSE
HE HAD NOT READ THE AFFIDAVITS.

The Judge apologized for being unprepared. He said he "looked at the file this
morning for the first time. I didn't know I had it on my calendar". The issues framed by
Roller's Counterclaim, insofar as this appeal is concerned, include whether the Plaintiff:
(5) .. .was confused about several of the issues, was negligent in some
of the work, and should not be compensated or was over-compensated for
work.
(6) . . .failed to adequately compare, complete, and follow-up proper
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree in the original
1983 case before Judge Christofferson, which failure compounded the lawsuits
and cost Defendant thousands of dollars in unnecessary legal fees, costs, and
general damages.
(7) . . .failed to adequately argue the law to the detriment of the
Defendant, costing him delay, extra attorney fees, loss of rights and emotional
distress for which Defendant is entitled to special and general damages.
(8) . . .failed to raise certain issues and defenses which would have
been to Defendant's advantage and likely would have saved time, saved
attorney's fees, and improved the outcome, which resulted in Defendant's
emotional distress, extra expense and loss of property, for which Defendant
is entitled to special and general damages.
(9) . . .had conflicts of interest that interfered with a zealous
representation of the Defendant, causing the Defendant loss of time, loss of
property, emotional distress, legal fees in excess of what should have been
required, for which Defendant is entitled to special and general damages.
(10) .. .failed to timely pursue some discovery issues, giving the other
side time to sanitize records before the Defendant obtained them, all of which
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was to the Defendant's detriment, and contributed to excess attorney fees,
costs, delay and loss of property, for which Defendant is entitled to special
and general damages.
(11) . . .failed to enforce the Defendant's contract rights with respect
to certain water rights and issues, which resulted in excess attorney fees, costs,
delay, and loss of property, for which Defendant is entitled to special and
general damages.
(12) . . .failed to ask the trial and appellate court for attorney's fees
from the other side, which was to Defendant's detriment and foreclosed the
possibility of recovering some attorney fees, which failure to ask was noted by
the District Court, and for which Defendant is entitled to offsets in an amount
to be proven in Court, and general damages.
(13) . . .failed to adequately and properly represent the Defendant in
any and all of the heretofore alleged particulars for which the Defendant
experienced mental distress, loss of time, illness caused by contaminated
water, loss of property and excess attorney fees.
(14) .. .in concert with others violated the Defendant's civil rights and
denied the Defendant due process of law causing additional damages to
Defendant.
See Counterclaim, R. pp. 10, 11, 12.
The word "malpractice" does not appear as such in the Counterclaim. The question
before the Trial Court August 29,1995 should have been limited to whether the Defendant,
considering the facts and inferences from facts most favorably to the Defendant, could
materially dispute the Plaintiffs general denial of those allegations. To find out whether
there are materially-disputed facts, Rule 56(c) requires the Court to conclude whether the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and affidavits fail to show a genuine issue
of material fact. How can there be such a conclusion without a complete and attentive
review? Instead, at this 11:00 a.m. hearing, the Judge said he had:
. . . done some speed reading this morning between hearings, but I don't think
I have reviewed more than half of what's there. I have reviewed all of the
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memoranda, but the exhibits and the affidavits and the supporting
documentation I've only partially worked through. R. 808, Line 21, et. seq.
Any litigant deserves better than that! With the Trial Judge's admission he did not read the
affidavits, the only argument to affirm is to sanction Koller for not providing a fully
prepared and deposed expert by October 28, 1995. That sanction is too harsh. The result
is to justify the Trial Court's apparent decision that expert testimony available after October
28, 1995 is not soon enough. The real issue is whether there are facts and inferences that
show malpractice, and there are. Just because the Judge did not read Roller's affidavits and
answers to interrogatories to find this out does not mean the Trial Court can't be reversed.
It should be.
When the Trial Court dismissed most of Roller's Counterclaim, it abused its
discretion by requiring that testimony and evidence of malpractice could only be offered by
a licensed attorney, made available by a cut-off date unrelated to trial or discovery. In
concluding this without reviewing Roller's affidavits, the Judge thought that the issues were
too complex to permit this former client to testify. The Judge had a very incomplete
understanding at the time of Roller's familiarity with the facts. Roller attempted to "fully
prepare" an expert. He had one obtained, but not ready. The Court did not fairly consider
the facts and inferences. He admitted he did not read them. Nothing in the response to
motions filed later suggests he ever read them. Partial Summary Judgment for Plaintiff
should be reversed.
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III.

PRESTON ARGUES FACTS WHICH PROVE THERE ARE MALPRACTICE
ISSUES.

Preston argues (Brief of Appellee, Page 5) he successfully defended Koller in the
1983 trial against Cornish Town, respecting water rights from the Pearson and Griffith
Springs, and that it was Koller who wanted to appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, to claim
the Trial Court erred by allowing Cornish Town to connect Koller to the town water supply
instead of using waters from the Pearson Spring. Appellee referred the Court to Cornish
Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 920. Preston's argument is not correct. There would have been
no need for an appeal if Preston had successfully represented Koller in the trial. Koller
refused to accept the substitution of a source of inferior water for a source in which he held
a vested right. In the 1983 trial, the court changed the source of Roller's water, to relieve
the town of problems of delivering potable water. The complete transcript of this case was
not obtained by Preston for this appeal, so Koller was faulted for not supplying it on appeal,
Id. 922. Koller has now obtained it, and the full transcript is herewith offered to Preston
and the Appeals Court. See the Trial Transcript February 16, 1983, pp. 619-625, 694, 695.
Addendum Tab 1 in this Reply Brief has the relevant portions of the entire transcript. The
entire transcript will be available for the trial on the malpractice issues.
It was the Supreme Court of Utah which recognized and ruled that Koller could only
reserve a right to use water to which he had deeded contract rights. Preston did not
properly raise the issue in the Trial Court after being advised by Koller to do so. This
necessitated the appeal. This point was reversed July 20,1988 for Koller after a lot of work.
Cornish Town v. Koller, 758 P.2d 920,921 (Utah 1988). Preston's inadequate representation
in that trial is referred to in this case, R. pp. 204-210,11 16 - 26, in Evan Roller's Affidavit
13

dated August 18, 1995. This is part of the material the Trial Court did not review. Since
it had not read the affidavit, the Trial Court could not make inferences favorable either to
Roller's knowledge and ability to testify about these facts, or that Koller could present
evidence of malpractice.
In 1983 the District Court was misled and confused by Preston's failure to present
pertinent records and to argue law regarding contract water rights as compared to
appropriated water rights, and about state regulations pertaining to municipal water rights.
The same Supreme Court decision was not so favorable for Koller in other ways,
however. The Supreme Court held that Pearsons (Roller's predecessor) did not reserve the
right to use water from the Cornish system. That really was not true. The Pearson Spring
is part of the Cornish system. As a municipal system, it must comply with state regulations
of public drinking water. Willard Hill, supervisor of environmental health for the Bear
River District Health Department wrote in a letter November 14, 1978 to Gayle Smith, the
State Division of Health that:
This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of November 8, 1978
concerning the Cornish water supply. . .
On November 9th, I accompanied Mr. Evan Koller to the Pearson Spring and
collected samples from the spring water and from the line, where the first
connection is Mr. Koller's home.
. . .At the time of the sampling we noted that a line from an open ditch was
leading to the collection box which we feel was definitely contributing to the
high coliform count we are experiencing on the Cornish system at the present
time. (Emphasis supplied. Letter included in Addendum Tab 1.)
The Town's attorney, William Fillmore, acknowledged in his opening statement for
the town February 16, 1983 in the trial of Case 18267 before Judge Christofferson, that:
The Deed also says that the Town agrees to pipe to the home of Lars Pearson
this water. The Town agrees with that. It would acknowledge at the outset
14

that it has a duty to lay and maintain an appropriate water line to the Roller's
house and is willing to do that if only an agreement can be reached with
respect to the appropriate size of that pipe. (Trial Transcript p. 9, Line 10,
included in Addendum Tab 1.)
In his Brief in Case 19981 to the Supreme Court, of which this Court may take
judicial notice, March 28, 1985, Mr. Fillmore argued, pp. 12-13:
The Pearsons knew that the Town of Cornish was purchasing the spring for
the development of the municipal culinary-quality water system, and it was
that system of which they wanted to be part. The only fair and reasonable
interpretation of the language of the deed is that the Town committed to
supply Rollers with a 3/4-inch tap for culinary and domestic water, and the
Town must determine how to get that water to them.
This reasonable interpretation (that Cornish is to supply human drinking water) had already
been made by the Court about this deed, at pp. 693-695 of its February 23, 1983 oral
decision! (Trial Transcript pp. 693-695, esp. p. 694, Line 22, included in Addendum Tab 1).
This shows that the Supreme Court ruling that Mr. Preston "obtained", wrongfully
concluded Pearsons had not reserved the right to use water from the Cornish Town system.
Cornish's own attorney argued the opposite of that conclusion! Preston failed to clearly and
concisely state those facts, and to present the pertinent parts of the record and law regarding
contract and appropriated water rights, misleading the Supreme Court. He also failed to
include this matter completely in the District Court's findings. The Supreme Court noted
Koller had "failed to provide the entire transcript of the proceedings below." Id. at 922.
The Court did not reverse this part for that reason. Koller now has obtained the complete
transcript and it is available for the "malpractice" trial.
The District Court had actually taken evidence about the place where the Town of
Cornish was to deliver water to Koller. It ruled from the bench in 1983 concerning this
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Pearson Spring, that Koller was not an appropriator. Instead, the Court (Addendum Tab
1, P. 693, Line 10) said:
The water that he uses is appropriated by Cornish out of the tap. His only
right is gained not as an appropriator but by the grant, again in the deed.
. . .And, again, this is a grant of water to originally the Pearsons and I now
make a finding, to their successors in interest to the property,. . .
. . .He's entitled to what the use is that's stated in the grant, again: water to
water his lawn, use in his house for whatever domestic purposes that they
have. . .
Now, there is no right to say where that diversion is to be made from
Cornish's water to him. He's entitled to receive that water, but he's not
entitled to say where he receives it from or to place in the pipe, and I do not
think it is restricted solely to the source of water at Pearson's Spring. In fact,
in order to comply with this, if they're to supply human drinking water, it may
be . . . So I make the further finding that the Plaintiff (Cornish) is entitled
to determine where that tap will be and to provide and pipe to a 3/4-inch tap
to the home of--in this case it says Lars Pearson, but now it belongs to Mr.
Koller, and I assume the appropriate place is, from the testimony-both
parties talked of a box or someplace where everything goes out from the
house, to the sprinklers, to the-I assume that's what it is from the testimony
I've heard. (1983 Trial Transcript, p. 693-695, Addendum Tab 1.)
Preston failed to clearly and concisely include these facts in the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. The omission gave rise to an illegal motion by Cornish
Town to change the location of the service tap 1,500 feet upstream, which would have
relieved the Cornish Town of the responsibility to deliver the water reserved to the Koller
home, and would further limit Roller's access to the water by placing Roller's service tap
in a pipe with zero pressure. This required the second appeal to the Supreme Court,
Cornish Town v. Koller, 798 P.2d 753 (Utah 1990). This also cost lots of time, effort, worry
and attorney fees. Damages to Rollers had multiplied. The portion of the Trial Court's
decision dealing with the source of the water to be delivered was reversed by the Supreme
Court (Id., at 757). Had Mr. Preston properly represented Koller in the first place, Roller
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claims there would have been no illegal motion as to the location of the service tap serving
the Koller home and no need for the second appeal to the Supreme Court.
The Brief of Appellee acknowledges that Preston was arguably negligent in drafting
the Findings and Conclusions of the Trial Court3, and thus recognizes there were actual
material disputes of the adequacy of Preston's representation. This Court should recognize
Koller could testify about this, and that he was also making reasonable efforts to get expert
testimony.
Paragraph 2(c), Page 5 of the Brief of Appellee quotes Roller's allegation that
Preston failed to adequately present state regulations regarding water pressures and pipe
sizes, but implies that presenting this was too much to expect of Mr. Preston. Mr. Koller
discovered for himself that there were such regulations when visiting the office of the State
Water Engineer.

He copied the entire book, "State of Utah Public Drinking Water

Regulations", and presented it to Mr. Preston in a looseleaf binder with notes on pertinent
sections. Preston failed to use it. That Preston could have used this information, and in
Roller's opinion should have used it, was also presented to the Trial Court in Roller's
Affidavit, R. 210, 1124, 25, but not read by the Judge.
At Page 6, sub-paragraph (d), Brief of Appellee, Preston claims he was successful in
forcing Cornish to switch its complaint from "one of condemnation to one of perpetual
easement of property".4 That is not true. Preston resisted the facts and law that would help

3

Page 5, Brief of Appellee, Line 11.

4

P. 6, Brief of Appellee, Lines 7-9. What Preston probably meant to write is
that Cornish switched its complaint from a condemnation for a fee simple to
a condemnation for an easement. This is the option stated in U.C.A.§78-34-2.
17

Koller. In a letter of March 22, 1986 to the Town of Cornish, Koller wrote: "How much
control do you need over the areas in question?" "Do you need the oil and mineral rights?
Hunting rights? Public access?" The Town advised Koller by letter July 14,1986 that it was
"imperative" to obtain fee title. Then, U.C.A. §78-34-2 did not (and still does not) allow
the condemnation of a protection zone in fee title. This issue, however, was not raised by
Preston in the hearing for immediate occupancy in October 1986 until Koller reminded
Preston of the issue of oil rights, mineral rights, hunting rights, etc. near the close of the
hearing. This failure was raised in Evan Roller's Affidavit (R. 212, H33). Preston failed in
that hearing to raise the statutory defense of which estates can be taken in a condemnation
proceeding. See Footnote 4. Judge Christofferson noted it for him, however, and ruled
during trial in 1988 that Cornish Town could not condemn a fee title for the right-of-way
it was seeking. Preston either did not understand the law on condemnation, or chose not
to raise the issue in the 1988 trial on the issues. In the Brief of Appellee, Page 17,
Paragraph 9, Mr. Hanni writes: "The attorney is charged with knowing the law." Mr. Koller
is able to recognize that Preston did not know it, and wrote about this to oppose the
motion. The Trial Court did not read Roller's Affidavit.
Koller raised many genuine issues of material fact by sworn statements the Trial
Court ignored. Roller's own knowledge and observation enabled him to perceive that
Preston did not know or apply the law efficiently for his client in several instances, some of
which this brief refers to for examples. It was obvious to Mr. Koller when he prepared his
affidavit these deficiencies had existed. Koller was not merely recalling them after he was
sued, either. He referred to them in letters he wrote to Preston September 23, 1990, June
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7, 1991, and August 13, 1991. These letters are in the Record at pp. 187, 189, and 194
(Exhibit D, Defendant's Response to Motion) and Tab 2, Brief of Appellant. In the second
letter (June 7, 1991, R. 189), Koller promised if Preston sued him he would file a
malpractice suit in a counterclaim. Koller then proceeded to recite his reasons, listing his
observations of Preston's legal failures. All three letters explain matters Koller thought to
be failures of Preston to meet the appropriate standard of care, or of the legal system.
There is no evidence the Trial Court considered Roller's familiarity with these cases, Roller's
ability to speak on these issues, or reviewed these letters before it ruled August 29, 1995.
So, it was not Mr. Preston who successfully represented Koller in forcing the Town
of Cornish "to switch its complaint", unless the fact that Koller and the Trial Judge pushed
him into it is reason to give him the credit. There should have been no need to raise the
fee title defense in trial had Preston pointed out, before the 1988 trial at the 1986 hearing,
that Utah Statutes simply do not allow condemnation of protection zones in fee title. See
U.C.A. §78-34-2. The fact Cornish did not need fee title became overwhelmingly evident
by the fact it amended its complaint to ask for an easement only. But, Preston failed to
raise the defense at the October 1986 hearing for immediate occupancy, and did not come
up with it himself in the 1988 trial. Koller pointed this out at his deposition in this case on
May 10, 1993 (Deposition p. 65, Line 22).
Preston did not disclose in advance the conflicts of interest referred to on Pages 6
and 7 of Brief of Appellee. The conflicts became evident to Koller by Preston's actions
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relevant to adverse litigants and his association with those litigants. Koller learned of the
conflicts after the fact. He summarized them to the Trial Court August 18, 1995.5
That there is a materially-disputed fact of whether Preston timely pursued discovery
issues is ratified on Page 7 of the Brief of Appellee and in Roller's sworn allegations to the
Trial Court, Page 226, 1145 of his August 18, 1995 Affidavit. Five years into the litigation
and after the trial on the issues, a deputy sheriff at a town meeting suggested Rollers ought
to obtain the records of the Town. When Koller approached Preston with the idea, Preston
asked what the records would be needed for. Until that time, discovery was unheard of by
Koller. Koller can now certainly testify what he found from those records, that he thinks
Preston should have asked for them, and how it would have helped. If a deputy sheriff can
appreciate the importance of records, and if Mr. Koller can explain their importance, a
juror, even without another attorney testifying about discovery, can probably understand it
also.
These material facts were not recognized because the Trial Court had not read, much
less analyzed, Roller's affidavit or sworn answers to interrogatories. There is no affidavit
to refute Mr. Koller.
It should not be too difficult for a jury to appreciate that attorney fees not asked for,
R. 229,1152, 53, were waived. Koller can testify from the Court record that Judge Low said
he would not allow attorney fees to be assessed because they had not been requested in the
pleadings filed by Mr. Preston.

See paragraph 42, R. 223 - 225, Affidavit of Evan Koller, August 18, 1995.
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Favorable facts and inferences in this case which the Trial Court failed to make
include that Koller was damaged by Mr. Preston's failures.

It does not take expert

testimony to show Roller's involvement in Court took him away from more pleasant things
in life, his business, and his family. Roller's Counterclaim asked for offsets to claimed
charges for errors in the bills and for work that generated the bill, as well as damages. As
early as September 11, 1995, the Trial Court had Evan O. Roller's original deposition
because Preston moved September 11,1995, R. 377, that the deposition become part of the
record. On pages 58 and 59 of that deposition, Roller testifies that he understood these
failures and believed them simple enough that he could testify about what he had a right
to expect of Preston.
Plaintiffs argument is that the Trial Court reviewed the facts and all inferences in
a light most favorable to Roller, by speed reading memoranda. Preston relies on the Court's
representation, made in the midst of its apology, that it had reviewed "all the memoranda".
The Judge apologized for being unprepared. He said he "looked at the file this morning
for the first time. I didn't know I had it on my calendar". His reference to speed-reading
(R. 808, Line 22), applies to about half the file, to include the memoranda, but not the
affidavits. Presumably his statement that he had partially worked through the affidavits and
the supporting documentation yielded less understanding than speed reading the
memoranda.6

6

The Court would have been offended had the Judge's and Roller's position
been reversed. Everyone has a right to have their case given at least as much
attention as a prudent person would give his own affairs. Where a judge is
presiding, the litigant should expect a rule as clear as 56(c) to be carefully
followed.
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The Court's initial intention was to review all of the file before making a ruling, for
the Judge said, "It's not likely that I'll be able to give you a decision this morning on the
issue". (See R. 809, Lines 5-7.) The hearing was at 11:00 a.m. The Judge should not have
pretended to understand a file having 346 pages of complex legal documentation, including
affidavits, which he didn't know existed until that morning. He also dealt with other cases
before that 11:00 a.m. hearing. The Court is expected to do justice, and didn't. If experts
would eventually be required, would the Court accept the opinion of experts who did not
have time to review the case and facts to which they testified? Probably not. After the
hearing, Mr. Koller spent many days preparing, and at least four days in Salt Lake talking
with experts trying to get them prepared. Finally realizing he could not meet the deadline,
he asked for an extension, R. Motion 499, Memo, 501; Affidavit 505-508. The Trial Court
erred in the initial ruling and in later refusing an extension.
Without a careful review of Affidavits, the Trial Court thought an expert was
essential because the issues would be too complex for non-attorneys. The Judge said that,
even in understanding U.C.A. §78-34-2, possibly fifty percent of the licensed members of the
bar would not "be qualified to address those issues, even though they're licensed attorneys",
R. 826, Lines 3-11. From that he concluded Koller could not explain it either. Koller
believes he can explain it.
How does an attorney obtain background? Someone has to pay, or he has to donate
his time. Are attorneys the only mortals with the mental capacity to understand a statute?
People can represent themselves in Court Pro Se, and could even refer to statutes. Could
a Pro Se litigant understand U.C.A. §78-34-2 and §78-34-4? These are short and relatively
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simple statutes. Evan Koller had become acquainted with them. He could testify about
them from his experience with one supposed "expert": the Plaintiff in this case! Section
78-34-2(1) lists exactly when a fee simple estate can be taken. A simple reading of subparagraphs (a) through (f) allows the easy conclusion that the purpose for which Cornish
demanded Roller's ground is not on the list. Sub-section (2) says that only an easement can
be taken for any other use. This is not too difficult to understand. An attorney does not
have to explain it. A fair factual inference for Koller is that Koller could explain it. In the
press of time at the hearing August 29, 1995, the Judge did not quote from this statute to
explain why it is too hard for fifty percent of the lawyers to comprehend. It is just as simple
to understand U.C.A. §78-34-4, which states, "Before property can be taken, it must appear
that the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law, and that the taking is
necessary to such use". This does not necessarily require an attorney expert to explain. Mr.
Koller himself has significant experience, for which he paid dearly.
Legislators, many of whom are non-lawyers, are allowed to understand, testify, and
vote in the application of the statutes just discussed. A non-lawyer can understand their
application, particularly if he had been involved in litigation concerning them, heard the
statements of the judges and observed the omissions of his own counsel in the case.
August 29, 1995, it was not possible for Koller to know how long it would actually
take to interview a number of attorneys and find a lawyer qualified to testify about these
and other issues. Preston had represented Koller for over nearly 20 years. To expect the
expert to be "fully" prepared, a requirement the Plaintiff wrote later, added additional
expectations. Roller's request for an extension of time was timely, reasonable and ignored.

23

Koller did retain an expert prior to the 60-day deadline, but the volume of material
and schedule conflicts made it impossible for the available expert to be fully prepared and
deposed by Roller's cut-off date. The Court and opposing counsel were notified of this
October 24, 1995 by Evan Roller's Affidavit and counsel's letter, R. 505-508.
Preston's attorney, Mr. Hanni, admitted he gratuitously added to the Order the
requirement that the expert witness be "fully prepared" to express "final" opinions. This
requirement was not in front of the Trial Court when Defendant's counsel thanked the
Judge for the 60-day opportunity to provide the expert. After reasonable efforts to comply,
it became apparent more time was needed, but Roller's reasonable extension request was
refused.
The portion of this case dealing with accounting is progressing. In fact, it is still in
discovery. Judge Judkins is now assigned to the case; not Judge Hadfield. The disclosure
by Mr. Preston of his accounting records-the subject about which he started this lawsuitwas far from complete when Judge Hadfield made the expert witness discovery cut-off for
Koller. Thus, time was not a critical factor. Preston finally produced on October 28, 1996,
what he now claims is "a complete inventory of all records". That's right: one year after
Koller was supposed to have his expert. It is document 107D, which would likely be page
815 if the pleadings continued in sequence. Mr. Preston answered this way:
Interrogatory 3: Set forth specifically all the reasons you have, if any, why the
total of the payments you acknowledged in answering Interrogatory No. 3,
Defendant's First Interrogatories, is not the $79,933.31 sworn to by George
Preston November 8, 1993.
Answer (By Mr. Preston): At the time of the commencement of this suit, all
of the records had not been located and since November 8, 1993, a complete
inventory of all records of Preston & Chambers has been assembled and is
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included in the attached documents. The total payments by the Defendants
to the Plaintiff as acknowledged in our records is the sum of $91,244.09.
(Plaintiff's Answer to Defendant's Fourth Set of Interrogatories and Request
for Production of Documents, Signed October 28, 1996, by George W.
Preston.)
Four years earlier, September 1,1992, Preston's attorney, Thomas L. Willmore, told
Roller's counsel he had in his possession (and he delivered) "all of the billings concerning
the various lawsuits", R. 199. A copy of that letter was available with Roller's Memorandum
to the Trial Judge when Koller argued (August 29, 1995) that expert testimony should not
be required yet, because discovery was incomplete. Preston himself provided his latest
billings four years after September 1992.

Koller was right:

relevant discovery was

incomplete.
Plaintiff had the burden of proving the balance claimed from Koller, and Preston still
hasn't made a prima facie case. One year after Koller should have had his malpractice
expert, Preston is still coming up with billing records. What is wrong with granting Koller
the extension of time to obtain an expert to supplement his own testimony about facts the
Trial Court failed to infer in his favor? For that matter, what is wrong with reversing the
Partial Summary Judgment because it was premature?
Plaintiffs argument, Brief of Appellee, Page 13, Paragraph 10, that Koller did not
retain an expert by October 28, 1995 is unfounded. In Roller's October 24, 1995 Affidavit,
supporting his Motion for an Extension of Time to get an expert, Koller asked for an
extension of time because Jeffrey W. Appel could not be ready in the time allotted, R. 506,
117. The expert had become involved, if not fully prepared. Appellee's Brief fails totally to
recognize any effort Koller made. Yet, Koller spent time, spent money, reviewed records
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and met with many people by the time his affidavit was prepared. Preston's argument that
Koller ignored the Court's Order, fails.
CONCLUSION
As he defended against Preston's claim for more money, Koller counterclaimed
Preston had already been paid too much and that Preston should give Koller a refund
because he hadn't done his work adequately. Preston was still searching his records for a
beginning point from which to justify his claim for more money. He still has not found it,
but he finally said he produced all his billing records-one year after Koller was supposed
to have his expert fully prepared and deposed.
It is reasonable that Koller have additional time to get expert testimony to use with
Roller's own testimony about the malpractice issues. Koller made reasonable efforts to
comply with the Court's Order. The Order was an abuse of discretion because Koller set
forth facts the Trial Court did not consider, facts from which inferences should have been
made that Koller could prevail on malpractice issues.
A litigant with extensive first-hand knowledge of a case and its circumstance should
be able to testify, to produce documents, and to recite what happened in Court proceedings
and in conferences with his prior counsel. Koller was knowledgeable about these things, and
able to write the letters that begin in the Record at Pages 189 and 194. As a lay person, he
understood the factual history of certain legal work by Preston. It is reasonable that a jury
could also appreciate what Koller expected, and why he expected it, from Roller's testimony.
If Roller's testimony would not have as much weight as that of an expert, that is a risk
Koller should be allowed to assume. But, he should not be denied the inferences to which
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he is entitled on Summary Judgment. His affidavits show there were genuine issues as to
material facts about Preston's malpractice. He did obtain an expert, and tried to have him
fully prepared and deposed. Meanwhile, Plaintiff did not produce all accounting records
for another year!
That there was outstanding discovery at the time was pointed out to the Judge, R.
820, 821. How could an expert be fully prepared with final opinions when discovery had not
ended? The Court's ruling August 29, 1995 did nothing to advance a trial date. The Court
did not have a pre-trial conference or try to set a date. Other things have delayed the trial,
not the least of which is that Plaintiff is still trying to demonstrate a defensible beginning
point to justify its Complaint.
The Court did not read Kollef s affidavits or sworn interrogatory answers August 29,
1996, did not consider them seriously afterwards, and did not consider the requirements of
Rule 56(c)(2) when it denied Roller his reasonable inferences. A former client ought to be
able to testify how documents and discovery were, or were not, obtained and to refer to a
Court record for statements the Judge said were obvious. He ought to be able to ask
questions about the necessity of legal work. He ought to be able to state his interpretation
of the Utah statutes, which statutes do not require lawyers to write, and state what is
obvious in them. He ought to have reasonable time to fully prepare and depose an expert
to assist. That "reasonable time" should be rationally related to other discovery, to a pretrial conference and to a trial date.
As a non-lawyer, Koller also ought to be able to refer to city water system regulations
which are not written only for lawyers. He ought to be able to ask, in a trial, why an expert
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in water law was not obtained by his own counsel, Preston, where the case involved water
rights and water law. The answer expected is that Mr. Preston said Koller did not need his
own expert, but he (Preston) could use the Town's expert and save Koller money. The Brief
of Appellee says a lawyer should know the law. That could apply to Preston. For the Trial
Judge to rule, without considering all the sworn testimony from Koller, that the only way
to present evidence Preston did not meet its duty of care is through a lawyer's testimony,
was an abuse of discretion. Koller presented enough facts to show there are malpractice
issues. He is entitled to inferences that a person not licensed as an attorney could testify
about at least some of those issues. As to matters that actually require an expert, Koller
made reasonable progress in getting one.
Neither the Court nor Preston should be concerned about delay in the case because
Preston is not, yet, ready for trial. Preston's disclosure, finally, of "a complete inventory of
all records" one full year after Koller was supposed to have experts fully prepared and
deposed prove Koller was right: discovery wasn't complete. On September 1, 1992, Mr.
Willmore, Preston's previous counsel, said: "I have received from the lawfirm of Preston
& Chambers all of the billings concerning the various lawsuits when Mr. Preston represented
Mr. and Mrs. Koller", R. 199. How incomplete that was! How reasonable is the relief
sought now by Evan Koller.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The Trial Court should be reversed on its refusal to allow Koller an extension of time
to obtain an expert. The Trial Court should be reversed on its decision to grant Partial
Summary Judgment. The Trial Court could be reversed on its ruling that Koller must have
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expert testimony about all claims about the duty of care owed by Preston. The Appeals
Court could shorten the case by removing some of the accounting issues, and granting
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Defendant overpaid the principal
amount claim by at least $11,669.78. For the sake of Defendant's Partial Summary
Judgment, this figure assumes the validity of Plaintiffs claim. The Appeals Court should
grant Koller his attorney fees on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of January, 1997.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of January, 1997, two true and correct copies of
the foregoing, REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT EVAN O. KOLLER, were mailed postage
prepaid to the following:
Mr. Glenn C. Hanni
Mr. Peter H. Christensen
Attorneys at Law
6th Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

29

LIST OF EXHIBITS ATTACHED TO DOCKETING STATEMENT
Exhibit:

Record Page No.

Order, March 18, 1996
682-683
Memorandum Decision, February 21, 1996
679-680
Memorandum Decision, February 5, 1996
676-677
Reply Memorandum, in Support of Motion
for New Trial, Motion to Reconsider and
Alternative Motion for Rule 54(b)
Certification, January 11, 1996
628-633
Order Re: Dismissal, January 11, 1995
626-627
Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel, December 14, 1995
587-594
Motion for New Trial, Motion to Reconsider
and Alternative Motion for 54(b) Certification,
December 13, 1995
567-568
Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial,
Motion to Reconsider and Alternative Motion
for Rule 54(b) Certificate, December 13, 1995
569-576
Memorandum Decision, November 22, 1995
563-566
Evan Roller's Reply to Objection to Defendant's
Motion for Hearing, November 3, 1995
560
Motion for Hearing, October 30, 1995
547
Memorandum in Support of Motion for
Extension of Time, October 24, 1995
501-504
Defendant and Counterclaimant's Motion
for Extension of Time to Provide Expert
Witnesses, October 24, 1995
499-500
Affidavit of Evan Roller, October 11, 1995
481-496
Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs Counter-Motion
for Summary Judgment and Reply in Support of
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on
Defendant's Counterclaim, October 11, 1995
456-480
Response to Motion to Publish Deposition, October 9, 1995
454
Defendant's Response Opposing Partial Summary
Judgment, September 22, 1995
442-444
Partial Summary Judgment, September 25, 1995
439-441
Order to Publish Evan O. Roller's Answers to
Interrogatories with Exhibits, September 13, 1995
422-423
Ray Malouf letter to First District Court Clerk,
August 21, 1995
Not in Record
Objection to Form of Partial Summary Judgment
and Motion for Hearing, September 11, 1995
412-413
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CONTENTS OF ADDENDUM EXHIBITS - BRIEF OF APPELLANT
No.
1.

Exhibit:

Record Page No.

Affidavit of Evan Roller, August 18, 1995
(Opposing Summary Judgment, $99,335.52 was paid; specific
failures to do certain legal work.)

R 200-231

2.

Exhibits A through E to Affidavit and Memorandum,
August 18, 1995
R 175-199
A.
Summons (October 14, 1992, issued late)
R 176
B.
Plaintiffs Interrogatory Answers, November 8, 1993
admitting only $79,933.31 received
R 177-183
C.
Letter from Defendant's attorney December 7, 1994,
informal discovery continuing
R 185
D.
Letters from Koller to Preston
September 23, 1990
R 187
June 7, 1991
R 189
August 13, 1991
R 194
E.
Letter from Plaintiffs attorney September 1, 1992
("all of the billings")
R 199

3.

Partial Transcript August 29, 1996
(Judge did not read affidavits)

4.
5.

6.

7.

R 807-809, 825-828

September 25, 1995 Order, ("fully" prepared with
"final" opinions was added)

R 439-440

Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit for Extension of Time
to Provide Expert Witness, October 24, 1995
(could not fully prepare, despite diligent efforts)

R 499-508

Affidavit of Jeffrey W. Appel, December 14, 1995
(Duty of care probably not met in specific matters. "It appears
Preston made some mistakes...")

R 587-594

Memorandum Decisions,
November 22, 1995
February 5, 1996
February 21, 1996

R 563-566
R 676-677
R 679-680
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RECORD ON APPEAL

The Record in this case should include:
Volume 1
Volume 2
Volume 3
Transcript August 29, 1995
Deposition of Evan Koller, May 10, 1993

1-231
232-533
534-806
807-8291
Tr. 1-832

These page numbers have been used by both parties on appeal. The Trial
Court file has additional pleadings now.
The deposition, Pages 1-83, without Exhibits 1-9 (containing 49 pages), is
included in Brief of Appellee in Exhibit Tab 3. Referencing the transcript by
these page numbers is appropriate because the Trial Court did not paginate
the original. The original deposition should still be included with the record.
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Addendum 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE

CORNISH TOWN,

)
PLAINTIFF,

-VS-

)
)

EVAN KOLLER S MARLENE KOLLER, )
DEFENDANTS.

CIVIL NO. 18267
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
OF PROCEEDINGS
PP. 1 - 188

)

TRIAL HELD IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT AND
CAUSE ON FEBRUARY 16

1983, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 10:30

A. M., BEFORE THE HON. VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, DISTRICT JUDGE,
PRESIDING WITHOUT A JURY.
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF

OLSON, HOGGAN S SORENSEN
WILLIAM FILLMORE, ESQ.
56 WEST CENTER ST.
LOGAN, UTAH 84321

FOR THE DEFENDANTS

PRESTON AND HARRIS
GEORGE W. PRESTON, ESQ.
31 FEDERAL AVENUE
LOGAN, UTAH 8'+3 21

GEORGE A. PARKER, CSR-CM
559 EAST 1150 NORTH
LOGAN, UTAH 8<f3'H
PH. 752-5394

1-

1 II

THE COURT:

RIGHT.

2

MR. FILLMORE:

IN OTHER W O R D S , THE AUTHENTICITY

3

IS STIPULATED TO SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION BY THE COURT.

4

PLAINTIFF HAS ALSO FILED AN AMENDED COMPLAINT HEREIN RECENT-

5

LY PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT WITH COUNSEL.

6

MENT IS

TH

PART OF THAT A G R E E -

A T DEFENDANTS 1 ATTORNEY NEED NOT FILE AN ANSWER

7

TO THAT AMENDED COMPLAINT, IT'S DEEMED DENIES IN ALL PARTIC-

8

ULARS.

9

AT THE OUTSET WHAT ISSUES WE ARE NOT ADDRESSING IN THIS CASE

FURTHERMORE, I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT THAT WE SPECIFY

10

THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS WHICH WE DISCUSSED AT THE PRETRIAL

11

CONFERENCE WHICH HAVE BEEN EX.PRESSLY RESERVED FOR A LATER

12

DATE POSSIBLY WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO EITHER PARTY.

13

ISSUES WOULD INCLUDE POLLUTION MATTERS, THE QUESTION OF ANY
INJUNCTION WITH RESPECT TO NITRATE POLLUTION IN THE PEARSON

14
15
„
,,
lbc
17

THOSE

||

18
1 9 II

SPRING OR GRIFFIFTHS SPRING, QUESTIONS AS TO THE POLLUTION
MATTERS SUPERVISED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH.

THOSE

ARE ALL RESERVED, AS WELL AS ANY POTENTIAL CONDEMNATION
ACTIONS WHICH THE TOWN LATER MAY DESIRE TO BRING
I THINK AT THE OUTSET I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATE-

20

MENT, YOUR HONOR, AND TRY TO PUT INTO FOCUS THE MATTERS THAT

21

WE'RE ASKING THE COURT TO RESOLVE IN LIGHT OF THE PARTIES'

22

INABILITY TO REACH A RESOLUTION AMONG THEMSELVES.

23

IT, THERE ARE TWO TYPES OFFJUES^ BEFORE THE COURT AND ONLY TWO

24

TYPES OF ISSUES.

25

PARTIES IN AND TO THE PEARSON SPRING AND THE GRIFFITHS SPRING.

AS IT SEE

ONE IS THE WATER RIGHTS OF THE RESPECTIVE

-7TOWN OF CORNISH.

I SHOULD SAY BY WAY OF BACKGROUND THAT THE

PEARSON SPRING HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE STATE ENGINEER'S
OFFICE AS A PRE-1905 DILIGENCE RIGHT.

THE PEARSON FAMILY

OWNED EVERY DROP OF WATER BY VIRTUE OF THAT DILIGENCE CLAIM
IN AND TO THE PEARSON SPRING.

COME 1937, LARS PEARSON, SR.,

HAVING DIED, HIS WIDOW EXECUTED A DEED WHICH IS ONE OF THE
EXHIBITS THAT'S BEEN STIPULATED CONVEYING ALL OF THE WATER
RIGHTS THAT SHE ENJOYED -- LET ME SCRATCH THAT AND START OVER
CONVEYING HER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY WHICH SHE OWNED, WHICH
WAS ESSENTIALLY THE -- HOW BEST TO DESCRIBE IT?
STROKE, THIS-AREA IN HERE (INDICATING).

IN A BROAD

PEARSONS DID NOT OWN

THIS AREA UP ABOVE IN THE PEARSON SPRING, IT WAS CALLED THE
PEARSON SPRING BECAUSE THEY'D USED THE WATER FOR OVER 40
YEARS, BUT THEY DID NOT OWN THE LAND UP HERE, THEY OWNED IT
DOWN BELOW, TOWARDS THE COUNTY ROAD.

SHE CONVEYED ALL OF HER

RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST TO THE LAND IN 1937 TO HER FIVE
REMAINING CHILDREN.

THERE'S LANGUAGE IN THERE WITH RESPECT

TO APPURTENANT WATER RIGHTS..
IN 1938, MRS. PEARSON, WHO RESERVED A LIFE ESTATE
TO THE PROPERTY AND, BY IMPLICATION, THE WATER, AND FOUR OF
HER FIVE CHILDREN DEEDED ALL OF THEIR RIGHTS IN AND TO THE
PEARSON SPRING TO THE TOWN OF CORNISH.

SO WE HAVE MRS. PEAR-

SON, WHO WILL BE REFERRED TO THROUGHOUT THESE PROCEEDINGS AS
EMMA PEARSON, CONVEYING ALL OF HER LIFE ESTATE IN AND TO THE
WATER AND WATERWORKS AROUND PEARSON SPRING TO THE TOWN, AND

-91 II SHOULD BE READ LITERALLY, THAT THE THREE-QUARTER-1NCH

TAP

2

MEANS A THREE-QUARTER-INCH

3

TIAL HOOKUP IN CORNISH AND THROUGHOUT THIS VALLEY, A 3/4-INCH

4

TAP FOR RESIDENTIAL, AS THE DEED SAYS, CULINARY AND DOMESTIC

5

PURPOSES.

6

INFORMED TYPICALLY YIELDS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF SIX TO EIGHT

7

GALLONS PER MINUTE.

8

TAP, WHICH IS THE STANDARD RESIDEN

NO MORE AND NO LESS.

THAT KIND OF TAP

THE RESERVATION OF USE IS IMPORTANT.

I'M

IT'S LIMITED

9

STRICTLY TO CULINARY AND DOMESTIC PURPOSES AND SOME STOCK-

10

WATERING.

11

THE HOME OF LARS PEARSON THIS-WATER.

12

THAT.

13

TO LAY AND MAINTAIN AN APPROPRIATE WATERLINE TO THE KOLLERS'

14

HOUSE AND IS WILLING TO DO THAT IF ONLY AN AGREEMENT CAN BE

15

REACHED WITH RESPECT TO THE APPROPRIATE SIZE OF THAT PIPE.

16

THE PIPE INTSELF WAS CONSTRUCTED

17

JECT.

18

OR LATER AS TO THE SIZE OF.THAT PIPE.

19

BELIEVE THAT THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO BE AND WAS A 3/4-INCH LINE.

20

THERE WILL BE SOME TESTIMONY TO THE EFFECT T1HAT IT WAS A ONE-

21

INCH LINE.

22

MR. KOLLER AND/OR HIS PREDECESSORS HAVE

23

LINES OFF OF THAT.

24

IN BECAUSE WE'LL LET MR. KOLLER DO THAT, BUT HIS EXISTING

25

LINE ESSENTIALLY COMES SOMETHING LIKE THIS, YOUR HONOR, FROM

THE DEED ALSO SAYS THAT THE TOWN AGREES TO PIPE TO
THE TOWN AGREES WITH

IT WOULD ACKNOWLEDGE AT THE OUTSET THAT IT HAS A DUTY

IN 1939; IT WAS A W.P.A. PROJ

THERE IS SOME DISPUTE WHICH WILL BE BROUGHT OUT SOONER
THE TOWN CONTINUES TO

ALSO THERE WILL BE TESTIMONY TO THE EFFECT THAT

MAYBE

INSTALLED

LATERAL

I COULD -- WE HAVEN'T DRAWN THIS
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EVAN 0. ROLLER, recalled as a witness in
hisJ own behalf, having heretof ore been duly sworn, was
examine d and testified further as follows:
DIRECT EXA MINATION
BY MF, :PRESTON:
Your name is Evan Ko H e r , you are the defendant

Q

in this action, youfve been sworn to testify previously
in this matter, and you're sti 11 under oath.
I show you what has been marked for identification
as exhibit number 61.

Can you identify that exhibit?

A

Yes, I can.

Q

When were those taken?

A

Day before yesterday

Q

Who took them?

A

I did.

Q

And are they fairly representative of the gates

What's that , the 21st?

as they appeared on that day t o each of the accesses on
your property?
This only shows the one access on the property

A
of

noi•th
Q

the Cornish cemetary.
Okay.
THE COURT:

ar

Now I don't think Mr. Hansen gave

|

Of t e s timony regarding the is sue on prescriptive rights.
MR.- FILLMORE:

None whatsoever, Your Honor.

-

141
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TIIE COUPT:

Okay.

(by Viv. Preston)

Q

Mr. Hansen indicated that you

should be very happy to be entitled to be hooked on or
connected to the Cornish water supply because the question
was asked to him, "Is there any doubt in your mind that the
water was in the town's main pipe as it runs by Evan Koller's
house is healthier and higher quality water than that which
reaches his tap to the west of his house?"
I111 ask you this question:

Are you willing, to

exchange the present water system you have for a connection
in front of your house at the city water main?
A

I refuse to exchange our present rights for that

hookup in front.
Q

And would you give the court the reasons why you

do not want to be hooked to the city water supply?
A
carefully.

I certainly will.
Number one:

I've thought this thing through

It's contrary to the deed or the

contract which we have with Cornish.

The deed reads that

we reserve the right in one certain spring.

Not in a well,

not in the drains that come down below Pitcher's corrals
and stuff that Cornish used to pump into the linos, not in
some other system, but "we reserve the right in one certain
spring.fl
It further says in that deed that Cornish agrees
to pipe said water to the home of Lars Pearson, which is

- 147 -
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our subsequent rights.
Q

Okay.

Now then—

A

And further—do you want me to go on down through

these?
Q

Yes.

A

Further, as has been demonstrated here in court

this day, whereas we How have prior rights to this water,
prior to Cornish, they reserved these rights to themselves,
if we go on that line in front then we get last rights to
that water.

We'll get water if everybody else in Cornish

has got water, but if they run out or if they draw that
pressure low we will have no water at all.
In fact, if you look at the geological map which
they introduced into this court, the elevations are such
between the top end of the Cornish line and our home,
there's an inch to a hundred twenty feet in difference.

If

they get low on the top end of that line, and as they have
indicated they often do, when we open our taps in our house,
at that time they'll suck air and they1IT literally suck
the water out of our house to service the rest of Cornish.
I do not want—I'll refuse to trade prior rights for last
rights.
Q

Okay.

Next item.

A

Poor quality water is my next objection.

The

water which they are pumping out of that well is high in

- 148 -
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arsenic, it's high in iron, it's high in flourides, it's
high in sulfur, it's high in manganese, it does not meet
state specs in several respects alone.

You might can mix

it with some other water, but that' s just like mixing rotten
eggs with good eggs and saying that a cake made out of
half rotten eggs and half good eggs is okay.
If I was to be putting arsenic in Cornish's
system up there in any amount whatsoever, they would object.
MR. FILLMORE:

I have an objection to this line

of questioning if he's testifying as an expert as to what's
in that water.

I don't believe we have any foundation

for some of these things.
MR. PRESTON:

Oh, yes, you do.

You put the

exhibit in yourself, counselor, as one of the many exhibits
from the State Health Department showing exactly the content
of the water.
MR. FILLMORE:

We have the one exhibit which

indicates some arsenic which is in acceptable limits, and
iron which is in acceptable limits, and that's all that's
in the record.
THE COURT:

All right.

tie's saying that whatever

is in the record, and it shows, he doesn't like, obviously,
MR. FILLMORE:

Right.

Rut he's going far beyond

the record.
Q

Okay, the next objection.

- 14° -
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A

Trie next thing I object to is the pressure.

At

our home at this point we have about 110 pounds of pressure.
If I was to go onto that line it would be reduced mate rially.
The maximum which we could achieve on that home would be
64 p ound s.

That would be the maximum and it would be

reduced on down from there.

We checked the pressure the

other day as Mr. Hansen indicated at the cemetary.
SO pound s there.

We had

When you take the elevation off of that

map at the cemetary as opposed to where our house is, v/e
will be approximately at 64 pounds of pressure.
However, when they are low on water down in CornishL
whic h th ey often are, we won't have any pressure, and as
I've ind icated to the court before, our toilets won't flush,
our pressure waters won't function, our sprinklers won 't
fume tion , our washers won't function.

I

Somebody in the

shower and somebody turns the water on outside, the sir ower
doesn' t function.

We just can't operate.

Q

Your next objection.

A

I think that pretty well covers it.

Q

How about fire hydrants?

A

Well, yes, fire hydrants, that's true.

fire hyd rants won't function either.

Our

Mow I neglected to

mention in court the other day we do have a fire hose in
the home

It's the same type of fire hose they put in

1 some of the church houses, school houses, and so forth .

It

- 150 -
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requires a one and a quarter-inch line to service that
fire hydrant.

With low pressure it too won't function.

The ones in the yards won't function.

V/e value that pressure

which we have off of our present hookup very highly.
Q

And are you willing at this time to enter into

any kind of a trade or any kind of an arrangement in which
you'd substitute what you have presently for a hookup in
front of the home on the city main?
A

No way.
MR. PRESTON:

No further questions.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MP. riLTi^ORK:
Q

Mr. Keller, you bought the Pearson property in

1?60; is that right?
A

V/e took possession of it in the fall of 1°5°.

Q

The deed was signed in early

f

60. Okay,

When

was the last time the Butlers lived in that house?
A

I don't really know.

Q

Hadn't lived there for several years though, had

they, when you bought it?
A

The Butlers?

Q

Butlers or Pearsons or anybody.

A

.Butlers sold it to Pearson is my best recollection,

but I'm not clear ox] this, back in 1 °28 or somewhere there,
I have no knowledge of that.

- 151 -

-693EXCEPT FOR THE NECESSITY OF THOSE PARTICULAR THINGS THAT
I'VE ENUMERATED, HE HAS NO RIGHT TO DO THAT.

I OF COURSE

CAN'T PUT IN THE DECREE THAT THE JUDGE WILL GO UP AND WATCH
THE PLACE TWENTY-FOUR HOURS A DAY TO SEE HE DOESN'T WASTE
ANY WATER, BUT I ASSUME THAT THIS CAN BE SHOWN BY CORNISH,
THAT THE USES TO WHICH HE PUTS IT IS A WASTE OF WATER, THEY
CAN IN SOME WAY RESTRICT THAT TIME OF USE BY INJUNCTION WITH
CONTEMPT PROVISIONS OR WHATEVER.
PEARSON SPRING.
HE'S NOT AN APPROPRIATOR.

THE TAP.

THE SAME SITUATION.

THE WATER THAT HE USES IS APPROPRI-

ATED BY CORNISH OUT OF THE TAP.

HIS ONLY RIGHT IS GAINED NOT

AS AN APPROPRIATOR BUT BY THE GRANT AGAIN IN THE DEED, WHICH
I ASSUME OR WILL STATE AS A FINDING THAT THE INTENT IT
APPEARS OF THE PARTIES THAT THIS WAS TO BE APPURTENANT TO
THE PROPERTY AND THAT THE PEARSONS DIDN'T INTEND, IF THEY
SOLD IT, TO TELL THE PEOPLE THEY SOLD IT TO THAT THEY WERE
GOING TO GET THE WATER SHUT OFF, AND I DON'T BELIEVE CORNISH
HAD THE IDEA THAT THIS WAS TO BE THE CASE OF A TERMINATION
ON TRANSFER EITHER, AND WOULD MAKE THE SAME FINDING.
AND, AGAIN, THIS IS A GRANT OF WATER TO ORIGINALLY
THE PEARSONS AND, I NOW MAKE A FINDING, TO THEIR SUCCESSORS
IN INTEREST TO THE PROPERTY, A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF WATER FOR
DRINKING, STOCKWATERING PURPOSES, AND CULINARY AND DOMESTIC
PURPOSES, WHICH DOESN'T INCLUDE THE FISH POND, BY THE WAY.
IT DOES INCLUDE WATERING WHAT PLANTS, SHRUBS, LAWNS, STOCK,
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PUTTING WATER

2

ALLY USE AROUND THERE, THE SAME WAY AS I BELIEVE ONE OF THE

3

WITNESSES TESTIFIED OFF OF HIS DOMESTIC SUPPLY HE TAKES OUT

4

AND WATERS HIS COWS AND CLEANS HIS DAIRY EQUIPMENT AND EVEN

5

STORES SOME WATER THERE FOR THAT PURPOSE, AND I SEE NOTHING

6

WRONG WITH THAT.

7
8

IN YOUR TRUCKS AND CAR AND WHATEVER YOU GENER-

THAT'S A PROPER DOMESTIC AND CULINARY USE.

IT IS NOT RESTRICTED, AGAIN, BY GALLONS PER MINUTE,
|| FOR EXAMPLE.

I THINK ONE OF YOU STATED, FIGURED OUT 46,000

9

GALLONS, WHATEVER THAT FIGURE WAS, WOULD GO IF YOU LEFT IT

10

CONTINUALLY OPEN AND —

11

HE'S ENTITLED TO WHAT THE USE IS THAT'S STATED IN THE GRANT,

12

AGAIN:

BUT THAT ISN'T WHAT HE'S ENTITLED TO.

WATER TO WATER HIS LAWN, USE IN HIS HOUSE FOR WHAT-

13 || EVER DOMESTIC PURPOSES THAT THEY HAVE.

IT'S NOT TO BE USED -

14

AND I THINK I'VE ENUMERATED MOST OF THEM —

15

ISN'T FOR AGRICULTURE, BUT IT'S RESTRICTED BY THAT USE.

16

IT CERTAINLY

NOW, THERE IS NO RIGHT AS TO SAY WHERE THAT DIVER-

17 ||

SION IS TO BE MADE FROM CORNISH'S WATER TO HIM.

HE'S EN-

18

TITLED TO RECEIVE THAT WATER, BUT HE'S NOT ENTITLED TO SAY

19

WHERE HE RECEIVES

IT FROM OR TO PLACE IN THE PIPE, AND I DO

20

||

NOT THINK IT'S RESTRICTED SOLELY TO THE SOURCE WATER OF

21

||

PEARSON SPRING.

IN FACT, IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THIS, IF

22

THEY'RE TO SUPPLY HUMAN DRINKING WATER, IT MAY BE THAT THE

23 ||

SOURCE OF SUPPLY JUST OUT OF PEARSON'S WITHOUT IT GOING

24

||

THROUGH THEIR FILTRATION AND CHLORINATING AND WHAT OTHER

25

"

SYSTEM THEY HAVE TO DO TO PASS HEALTH STANDARDS THEY COULDN'T
COMPLY BY TAKING

IT WITH PROVIDING HIM THE WATER.

SO I MAKE

-695A FURTHER FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO DETERMINE WHERE THAT TAP WILL BE AND TO PROVIDE AND PIPE TO A 3/4INCH TAP TO THE HOME OF —

IN THIS CASE IT SAYS LARS PEAR-

SON, BUT NOW IT BELONGS TO MR. KOLLER, AND I ASSUME THE
APPROPRIATE PLACE IS, FROM THE TESTIMONY -- BOTH PARTIES
TALKED OF A BOX OR SOME PLACE WHERE EVERYTHING GOES OUR FROM
TO THE HOUSE, TO THE SPRINKLERS, TO THE —

I ASSUME THAT'S

WHAT IT IS FROM THE TESTIMONY I'VE HEARD.
FURTHER FIND THAT PEARSON SPRING WATER SUPPLY IS
GOVERNED BY THE COLLECTION BASIN —

OR NOT JUST THE BOX, BUT

THE BASIN OUTLINED IN BLUE BY DR. HANSEN AS TO WHERE THE
WATER SOURCE IS AND IS NOT ONE SINGLE SPRING BUT MAY BE COMPOSED OF SEVERAL SPRINGS.

I STATE THIS FOR THE PURPOSE, AND

MAKE THIS A FINDING, FOR THE PURPOSE OF WHAT MAY HAPPEN TO
WATER RIGHTS TO THAT SPRING, AND AS I TOLD YOU THIS MORNING
I'M GOING TO RESERVE A DECISION TO THAT ONE POINT.
CORNISH DID PURCHASE FOUR-F IFTKS, AND I BELIEVE
EVERYBODY AGREES, OF WHATEVER THOSE .RIGHTS WERE, AND MR.
KOLLER PURCHASED THE ONE-FIFTH INTEREST OF MARIE DOBBS.
NOW, IT'S THE POSITION OF CORNISH SHE DID NOT HAVE ANYTHING
LEFT TO TRANSFER BY REASON OF SOME TYPE OF FORFEITURE, AND
I HAVEN'T HAD A CHANCE TO READ YOUR AMENDED COMPLAINT, I'M
NOT EVEN SURE OF YOUR THEORY.

I THOUGHT FIRST IT WAS ABAN-

DONMENT, BUT YOU SAY YOU HAVE A DIFFERENT ONE, SO AS TO
THAT POINT —

AND I WOULD MAKE A FINDING THAT IF SHE HAD LOSTJ

THE RIGHTS AND HAD NO RIGHTS, OF COURSE SHE CAN'T TRANSFER

i
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November 14, 1978"

Mr. Gayle Smith
Bureau of Water Works
State Division of Health
P.O. Box 2500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

~

- •-' «!>J/J

;' •'•••••- ...
••*-".-^.-.?t. ...,..V;'"

Dear Mr. Smith,
This letter will confirm our telephone conversation of November
8, 1978, concerning the Cornish Water supply. As stated in our telephone conversation we are very concerned about the reported r a d i o activity of this particular source, (Pearson Spring).

CG-^Ar v A
As you know we have submitted samples from each of the three
sources of water used by Cornish. 1. Pearson Spring, 2. Griffin
Spring, 3. Pump well. We have had some conversation with Dr. Mecham
of the State Radiological lab and he states that he is not able at
this- time to make a definite analysis of the radio activity^of the
samples submitted because of a breakdown in equipment, but that he
feels there is definitely some cause for concern.
On November 9th I accompanied Mr. Evan Kohler to the Pearson
Spring and collected samples from the spring water and from the line,
where the firsX connection is Mr. Kohlers home. These samples were
submitted to the Utah State University lab but their equipment was not
sophisticated enough to make a definite analysis. At the time of the
sampling we noted that a line ^^m_^n^£pen ditch was leading to the
collection box which we feel was definitely contributing to the high ^.Tv
coliform count we are experiencing on the Cornish system at the
7>,.-r^trt v
present time.
We are real concerned at this time and request the resources
of the State pivision of Health to help us investigate this problem.
We respectively request that you follow up the testing of the
radio activity of the Pearson Spring source by the E.P.A. at Denver.
Please notify the Bear River Health Department when we may have
a member of your staff help us investigate this problem.
Sincerely,

/l*L MaMJy^/sJul
Willard K. Hill, R.S.
Supervisor, Environmental Health
WKH:sl
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State of Utah
Department of Health
Division of Environmental Health
Bureau of Public Water Supplies

STATE
PUBLIC

DRINKING

OF

UTAH

WATER

REGULATIONS

Part I - Administrative Rules
and
Part II - Design and Construction Standards

These regulations were adopted by the Utah Safe
Drinking Water Committee under the authority of
Utah Code Annotated Section 26-12-5 (1953) as Amended
Original adoption on October 18, 1979
1st Revision adopted August 28, 1980
2nd Revision adopted June 25, 1981
3rd Revision adopted April 16, 1984

Robert B. Hilbert, Chairman
Utah Safe Drinking Water Committee

Michael J^tapley
Acting Executi>^ Director
Utah atajte Department of Health
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1.9

DEFINITIONS

mmmmmmmmmmm
The following definitions apply to this section:
Approval - Unless indicated otherwise, shall be taken to mean a written
statement of acceptance.
Committee - Means the Utah Safe Drinking Water Committee.
Executive Secretary - Means the Executive Secretary of the Utah Safe
Drinking Water Committee.
Must - Means that a particular action is obliged
accomplished.

and

has

to be

Service Connection - The means by which a dwelling, commercial or
industrial establishment, or other water user obtains water from the
supplier's distribution system.
Multiple dwelling units such as
condominiums or apartments, shall be considered to have multiple
connections. Each unit in these dwellings shall be considered to have
one connection.
Shall - Means that a particular action is obliged
accomplished.

and has to be

Should - Means that a particular action is recommended but does not
have to be accomplished.
Water Supplier - Means a person who owns or operates a public water
system.

12-1

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM

12.0 WATER MAIN DESIGN

12.0.1 DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PRESSURE
The distribution system shall be designed to maintain a minimum
pressure of 20 psi (at ground level) at all points of connection
to the distribution system during peak instantaneous flow conditions, including fire flow conditions.
However, non-community systems in remote areas can be exempted
from this requirement, on a case-by-case basis, if flow from the
system is always unregulated and free-flowing.

12.0.2 PEAK INSTANTANEOUS FLOW RATES
Peak instantaneous flow rates for domestic use to be assumed when
designing distribution systems shall be as given in Section 5 of
these regulations.
Peak instantaneous flow rates for fire flow conditions shall be
determined by the engineer and reported to the Bureau of Public
Water Supplies during the plan review process.
Peak instantaneous fire flows.must be added to peak instantaneous
domestic demands for distribution system design.

12.0.3 MINIMUM WATER MAIN SIZE
The distribution system shall be sized to deliver the peak instantaneous demand rate as determined in Section 5 while maintaining
the pressures required by Section 12.0.1. Minimum size serving a
fire hydrant on a community system shall be six inch diameter.
For supply lines not connected to fire hydrants serving community
systems, the minimum line size shall be two inch diameter. Sizes
of lines serving non-community systems shall be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis. Mains should be designed with sufficient
excess capacity to provide for anticipated future connections.
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On all new and extensive distribution system construction, evidence of satisfactory disinfection must be provided to the Bureau
of Public Water Supplies. Samples for bacteriologic analyses must
be collected after disinfection is complete and the system is refilled with potable water. The use of water for culinary purposes
must not commence until the bacteriologic tests indicate the water
to be free from contamination.

12.5 CROSS CONNECTIONS AND INTERCONNECTIONS
There shall be no physical cross connections between the distribution
system and pipe, pumps, hydrants, or tanks which are supplied from, or
which may be supplied or contaminated from, any source except as approved by the Executive Secretary.
The approval of the Executive Secretary shall be obtained for interconnections between different potable water supply systems.

12.6 WATER HAULING
wmmm —
Water hauling is not an acceptable permanent method for culinary water
distribution in community water systems. However, the Executive
Secretary may allow its use for non-community public water supplies
if:
1.

Consumers could not otherwise be supplied with good quality
drinking water, or

2.

The nature of the development, or ground conditions, are such
that the placement of a pipe distribution system is not justified.

Hauling may also be necessary as a temporary means of providing
culinary water in an emergency.
All proposals for water hauling must be submitted to and approved by
the Executive Secretary. The guidelines for water hauling are
contained in the bulletin entitled "Recommended Procedures for
Hauling Culinary Water" available from the Bureau of Public Water
Supplies.

i£^JSER^

12.7.1 SERVICE TAPS
Service taps shall be made so as to not jeopardize the sanitary
quality of the system's water.
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12.7.2 SERVICE LINES
The portion of the service line under the control of the water
supplier is considered to be part of the distribution system and
shall comply with all requirements given herein. Attention is
drawn to Section 12.2 with regards to service lines crossing sewer
lines.

12.7.3 SERVICE METERS
Each service connection should be individually metered.

12.7.4 ALLOWABLE CONNECTIONS
All dwellings or other facilities connected to a public water
supply must be in conformance with the Utah Plumbing Code.

